Arms-limitation negotiations

The centrepiece of a bilateral U.S.–Soviet détente, however, had to be the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which began in  1969. After a decade of determined research and deployment the Soviet Union had pulled ahead of the United States in long-range missiles and was catching up in submarine-launched missiles and in long-range bombers. Indeed, it had been American policy since the mid-1960s to permit the Soviets to achieve parity in order to stabilize the regime of mutual deterrence. Stability was threatened, however, from the technological quarter with the development of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), by which several warheads, each aimed at a different target, could be carried on one missile, and antiballistic missiles (ABMs), which might allow one side to strike first while shielding itself from retaliation. In the arcane province of strategic theory, therefore, offense (long-range missiles) became defense, and defense (ABM) offense. Johnson had favoured a thin ABM system to protect the United States from a Chinese attack, and in 1969 Nixon won Senate approval of ABM deployment by a single vote. He intended, however, to use the program as a bargaining chip. The Soviets had actually deployed a rudimentary ABM system but were anxious to halt the U.S. program before superior American technology left theirs behind. The public SALT talks stalled, but back-channel negotiations between Kissinger and Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin produced agreement in principle in May 1971 to limit long-range missiles and ABM deployment. The American opening to China made the Soviets increasingly eager for a prompt agreement and summit meeting, while the Americans hoped that Moscow would encourage North Vietnam to be forthcoming in the peace talks.

Since 1968 North Vietnamese negotiators had demanded satisfaction of Premier Pham Van Dong’s “four points” of 1965, including cessation of all U.S. military activity in Indochina, termination of foreign military alliances with Saigon, a coalition government in the South that included the NLF, and reunification of Vietnam. The United States demanded withdrawal of all foreign troops from the South, including the PAVN. This deadlock, plus Hanoi’s anxiety over the possible effects of détente, prompted another North Vietnamese bid for victory on the battlefield. In March 1972 they committed 10 of their 13 divisions to a massive offensive. Nixon responded by ordering the resumption of bombing of the North for the first time since 1969 and the mining of the harbour at Haiphong, North Vietnam’s major port. The offensive stalled.

Nixon’s retaliation against North Vietnam prompted speculation that the U.S.S.R. would cancel the planned summit meeting, but Soviet desire  for détente prevailed. Kissinger visited Moscow in April 1972 to work out details on SALT and draft a charter for détente. Nixon instructed him “to emphasize the need for a single standard; we could not accept the proposition that the Soviet Union had the right to support liberation movements throughout the world while insisting on the Brezhnev Doctrine inside the satellite orbit.” The Soviets, however, refused to make explicit concessions and defined détente as a means of preventing the inevitable struggle between “progressive” and “reactionary” forces from escalating into war. The result was a vague statement of 12 “basic principles of mutual relations” committing the two parties to peaceful coexistence and normal relations based on “sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage.” Nixon then proceeded to Moscow in May 1972 and signed 10 documents providing for cooperation in economics, science and technology, outer space, medicine, health, and the environment. Most important were the SALT accords: an Interim Agreement limiting ballistic-missile deployment for five years and the ABM Treaty limiting each side to two ABM sites, one protecting the national capital, the other a long-range missile site. The treaty also enjoined the signatories not to interfere with each other’s “national technical means of verification,” a de facto recognition of each side’s space-based reconnaissance satellites.

The preliminary SALT agreement appeared to be a significant achievement, but there was in some ways less to it than met the eye. The treaty mandated controlled increases, not decreases, in the Soviet arsenal, while failing to ban development of cruise missiles, space-based weapons, or the MIRVing of existing launchers by the United States or the U.S.S.R. Thus the superpowers sacrificed the right to defend their attack missiles with ABMs while failing to ensure the stability of mutual deterrence. In sum, the limitation of one sort of nuclear launcher (long-range missiles) did not preclude a continuing arms race in other sorts of launchers or in technological upgrades. To be sure, the mere fact of a U.S.–Soviet agreement seemed of psychological value, but only if both sides were genuinely seeking to reduce arsenals and not simply to maneuver diplomatically for a future advantage. Hence the practical value, or danger, of SALT would be revealed only by superpower behaviour in years to come.

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international relations - Student Encyclopedia (Ages 11 and up)

The world of the early 21st century is a global community of nations, all of which coexist in some measure of political and economic interdependence. By means of rapid communication systems-radio, television, and computers-much of what happens in one place is quickly known almost everywhere else. The speed of transportation in aircraft also makes it possible for people to get around the globe in hours instead of days or weeks.

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